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FORUM
Invited article
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE REGIMES 
IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: MULTINATIONALS, 
STATES AND NGOs AS POLITICAL ACTORS
While laissez-faire economy was the product of deliberate state action, 
subsequent restrictions on laissez-faire started in a spontaneous way. Laissez-
faire was planned; planning was not. (Polanyi, 2001, p. 147)
INTRODUCTION
Brazil recently experienced one of the world’s worst environmental disasters when the Samarco 
mining company’s Fundão tailings dam burst. This tragic disaster, which occurred on 5 November, 
2015, killed 17 people, swept away a district of the town of Mariana, polluted the Rio Doce river 
valley and degraded the water supply of 35 towns, negatively affecting the lives of millions of 
Brazilians (Aragão & Paes, 2016), and even impacting the waters of the South Atlantic. This was 
the world’s worst environmental disaster involving a tailings dam to date (Bowker, 2015). As of 
June 2016, polluted sediment was still washing through the river and Samarco had still not paid 
the fines imposed on it. The mining company, jointly controlled by Australian-based multinational 
BHP Billiton and Brazil’s Vale, was previously recognized as a leader in environmental standards, 
receiving numerous international awards and certifications (as did its joint owners). Although it 
is still too early to confirm with any certainty, since the investigations are still underway, there 
is evidence that this disaster was the result of a lack of adequate regulation, both by the market 
and by the state (Phillips, 2015).
The Samarco case emphasises the dangers of allowing multinationals to operate without 
adequately monitoring their activities. There is an increased awareness that multinationals 
can cause serious problems for the environment, the workforce, the state, and communities at 
large. As many of these problems are transnational as well as national, they cannot be resolved 
by nations alone. However, creating international organizations through agreements between 
nation-states and then implementing international rules and legal sanctioning-mechanisms has 
proved problematic. Transnational social movements have used reputational mechanisms to 
embarrass firms in front of their employees, their customers and their shareholders when they 
have transgressed broadly-accepted standards. The goal of creating a structure that encourages 
good behaviour has led to the formation of systems of certified rules and labelling. In these multi-
stakeholder contexts, social movements, firms and states have developed rules and monitoring 
systems that provide consumers, shareholders and states with certain guarantees. These ensure 
that particular products meet particular pre-agreed standards and they are labelled accordingly 
with recognisable badges, such as, for example, those of the Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC).
There are, however, multiple problems associated with this particular model, some of 
which are explored in our Forum. One of these involves competing labelling and regulatory brands, 
some established by firms to offer a more lenient regulatory regime than would otherwise be 
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unacceptable if a transnational social movement were involved 
(Bartley, Koos, Samel, Setrini, & Summer, 2015). Another problem 
concerns monitoring and the considerable variations found in 
local contexts and practices that challenge the rather generic 
standards usually negotiated in global partnerships, such as in 
the case of aquaculture in Indonesia (Schounten, Vellema, & Wijk, 
2016). The interaction between transnational social movements 
and national states is also problematic. States often legitimately 
claim authority over their territories and obstruct or object 
when transnational social movements become involved. This is 
especially an issue between states in the Global South, whose 
concern is with rapid development in order to reduce poverty, 
and social movements in the North, who often advocate caps 
on growth. Unlike governments, transnational social movements 
are not elected. On the other hand, governments can be subject 
to corruption that prevents hard laws, regulations and sanctions 
from being implemented properly, even when these governments 
have the capacity to do the job and a sufficiently extensive cadre 
of experts bound by bureaucratic rules and careers at their 
disposal. With these issues in mind, the focus of this Forum is on 
the development of transnational governance mechanisms, and 
how multinationals, social movements and states, particularly in 
the Global South, deal with the challenges they represent.
Drawing on Polanyi, we look at the transnational 
governance literature that is the subject of this Forum and 
consider three questions: (1) what is the role of the state within 
Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ and the limitations of the state 
as a governance mechanism under globalisation; (2) how can 
transnational NGOs and social movements explore gaps in 
governance within capitalism as an alternative way of restraining 
the market powers exercised by MNCs, and finally; (3) under 
globalised capitalism, how can the Global South position itself 
within the global economy and the development of governance 
mechanisms.
THE STATE, POLANYI, AND THE ‘DOUBLE 
MOVEMENT’
Although 21st Century capitalism has its own unique features, 
its development can still be seen through the lens of Polanyi’s 
‘double movement’ (Block, 2008). Using this concept, Polanyi 
describes how social actors construct institutions that confine 
and regulate markets. Tension between two opposing forces tends 
to be a characteristic of capitalism. On the one side one has the 
pressure for a free market, a neo-liberal argument in favour of 
more self-regulating mechanisms. Free markets, however, tend 
to generate inequality and economic conflicts that threaten the 
social order. This in turn creates pressure to tame these same 
markets by building institutions based on different principles, 
especially on the idea of citizenship and the rights of citizens to 
education, housing, healthcare and welfare provision and, more 
recently, a sustainable environment. The state has traditionally 
been the primary vehicle for providing such institutions, by using 
its monopoly over hard law and its tax raising powers to fund them. 
Thus, markets become socially embedded and free markets are 
no more than myths (Polanyi, 2001).
Nevertheless, the ‘double movement’ suggests that forces 
supporting the reduction of the state and the expansion of the 
market will continue their struggle to push the pendulum back the 
other way and away from the state. Block (2008) argues that the 
movement to disembed the market from society creates a great 
burden on ordinary people because they are obliged to endure 
the higher costs it implies. Consequently, the state’s efforts are 
often necessary to ensure that these groups are able to tolerate 
such costs without engaging in disruptive activism. Thus, the 
‘double movement’ creates a paradox, where the force of the state 
is necessary in order to impose the market logic and to control the 
associated risk of social disruption caused by increasing social 
tensions (Polanyi, 2001).
The Mariana disaster emphasises this paradox, paving 
the way for our first question about transnational governance: 
what is the role of the state in regulation as depicted in Polanyi’s 
‘double movement’? Whilst one dimension emphasises the state 
as providing society with a safeguarding cushion to deal with the 
market’s negative externalities, a second dimension emerges in 
the form of the need for state intervention as a counterweight 
to market influence. The Samarco case illustrates this issue, as 
concluded by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (OHCHR), which visited Mariana a few months 
after the disaster:
(…) Federal and State authorities need to play a more 
active role in the disaster response. (…) While Samarco is 
responsible for repairing the damage caused, the State 
remains the primary duty bearer to uphold human rights 
of affected communities. (…) There needs to be a better 
balance in the power structure relating to investments to 
ensure that a regulatory or State framework (...) resolve the 
power imbalance that may allow irresponsible business 
practice to go un-checked. (OHCHR, 2015)
Such an analysis takes a traditional state-centred view of 
regulation; that is, failings on the part of the state were ultimately 
behind the Samarco disaster. However, the UNHCR view also 
points to the role of transnational forces in monitoring and 
376
ISSN 0034-7590
FORUM | Transnational governance regimes in the Global South: Multinationals, states and NGOs as political actors
© RAE | São Paulo | V. 56 | n. 4 | jul-ago 2016 | 374-379
controlling markets. This is illustrated, in the Samarco case, by 
the role of the transnational social movement, Greenpeace, which 
has demanded justice for the victims, but has done so by using 
different methods, thereby reflecting the importance of going 
beyond Polanyi’s initial formulation. Greenpeace Australia Pacific 
has organised protests at BHP Billiton’s headquarters in Australia 
using information about the disaster received from Greenpeace 
Brazil to better inform its campaign (Greenpeace, 2015). This 
context emphasises that 21st century capitalism is global, not 
only due to the flow of capital and labour, but also to the rise 
of significant transnational actors and spaces interconnected 
via finance and networks of production (Morgan & Kristensen, 
2012), which in turn creates new spaces for governance that are 
simultaneously embedded in local and global spheres.
We would suggest, therefore that one should add 
new levels to Polanyi’s double movement. As firms become 
multinationals, and as social movements and problems become 
transnational and are no longer containable within national 
spaces, one must conceive new modes of governance that include 
and go beyond the nation state level and its capacity (or not) to 
regulate, monitor and control markets. In a complex globalised 
world, there are multiple potential levels of governance. In many 
cases, a transnational governance that is based on multiple 
stakeholders, all cooperating on building private/public hybrid 
forms of governance based on soft law and voluntary participation 
(where failure to participate generates significant competitive 
disadvantage and reputational damage) offers an essential 
complement to states. In contemporary capitalism, therefore, 
civil society at both national and transnational levels can play 
an important role in developing governance mechanisms. NGOs 
and social movements can assume the role of questioning and 
confronting such market powers by engaging with multilateral 
organisations or organising activities (e.g. campaigns and 
partnerships), in order to influence MNCs and their supply chains 
in favour of better practices (Perez-Aleman & Sandilands, 2008).
In this Forum, Vieira and Quack (2016) examine this 
question of how transnational social movements connect with 
national governance spaces, focusing on how local movements 
leverage transnational networks in order to influence domestic 
institutional regulation. They analyse the transnational 
mobilization of indigenous groups to influence the development 
of new institutions during the re-democratization period in Brazil. 
Identifying three trajectories of transnational mobilization 
between the 1960s and 1970s, Vieira and Quack show that 
transnational links created by these groups helped fashion a 
dense social movement able to influence national institution 
building. They analyse the links that bridge the local and global 
levels of this movement, and rather than just positioning actors 
within these levels, they show the simultaneous embeddedness 
of state and social actors within both local and global spheres. 
Such links are key when analysing the capacity of transnational 
activism to change a local institutional context because actors use 
them to gain knowledge, organize, and leverage multiple levels.
Similarly, several papers in this Forum show the 
simultaneous interconnections that exist between the nation-
state and the new spaces of governance. In the context of 
transnational markets and regulatory integration, countries 
in the South often lack the capacity to shape, implement, and 
benefit from global rules (Bruszt & McDermott, 2016). States 
in the South face certain challenges to improving their skills 
and resources in order to increase their capacities to produce 
national public goods. To achieve higher local capacity, the 
state must coordinate with civil society and global NGOs to 
complement resources and knowledge for addressing complex 
social and environmental problems (Schounten et al., 2016). 
Governments also create and leverage transnational alliances 
with other states, multinational companies, and global civil 
society organizations to develop their local economies. Srinivas 
(2016) shows how transnational forces influence the way in which 
local governments regenerate decaying urban infrastructure and 
manage development plans, whilst at the same time facing local 
civil society mobilization aimed at an equitable distribution 
of the benefits of national resources. Finally, as governments 
negotiate new global agreements and rules for regulating 
markets, transnational and local civil society demands to be 
included in global and local spheres so as to push for equitable 
and sustainable development (Delgado, 2016).
TRANSNATIONAL NGOs AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS AS GOVERNANCE ACTORS
How can transnational NGOs and social movements explore 
the spaces for governance that are emerging within 21st Century 
capitalism as an alternative way to restrain market power exercised 
by the MNCs? The phenomenon of transnational governance 
has emerged within contemporary capitalism as a result of the 
establishment of cross-border labour, capital and information 
flows and global supply chains. States have to compete for capital 
and foreign direct investment, and any ‘excessive regulation’ 
represents a potential threat to any competitive advantage they 
might offer. This feature of the neo-liberal order of recent decades, 
where states have shifted their focus to providing a favourable 
environment for foreign capital, has led to the offer of incentives 
to such firms in terms of reduced costs of doing business, lax 
taxation systems and a competitive edge on the back of reduced 
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regulation (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; Morgan & Kristensen, 
2012). Such measures to reconfigure the state and adapt it to the 
current conditions of globalization have, however, frequently 
raised the level of discontent in relation to the broader order, 
either as a result of disasters, such as that involving Samarco, or 
the impact of crises like the Global Financial Crash of 2008, the 
Eurozone crisis, or the current slowdown in economic growth in 
China and its impact on leading commodity exporters, such as 
Brazil. This emerging discontent across national boundaries and 
the weak and ineffective government response to it has led to a 
search for other forms of resistance. 
Transnational governance can assume two forms: soft law, 
such as certification, self-regulation, or co-regulated standards 
(public and private partners develop such standards together); 
and hard law, involving traditional command and control 
legislation (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006). As hard law is 
difficult to achieve at the transnational level, soft law mechanisms 
tend to predominate although the two can be combined. For 
example, the US Lacey Act makes it illegal to import timber 
sourced from non-sustainable forests; having the seal of approval 
from the FSC is prima facie evidence of compliance with this rule. 
Therefore, in this case, soft law and hard law combine against the 
US importation of timber from unsustainable sources.
Transnational governance has three main characteristics. 
Firstly, it involves multiple public and private sector actors 
(e.g. companies, NGOs and states). Secondly, transnational 
governance is multilevel, encompassing local, national and 
transnational levels. Disentangling these different levels poses 
a challenge. Finally, it represents a steering form of governance, 
since its mechanisms are the outcome of different networks of 
influence and negotiation (Djelic & Sahlin-Andersson, 2006; 
Rasche & Gilbert, 2012). 
Transnational governance has, however certain weaknesses. 
Are these systems accountable, for example? Certainly not 
to electorates. There is no real ‘democratic’ element to them, 
except perhaps obliquely through the role that democratically 
elected states may play, which is often weak compared to that of 
corporations. Transnational NGOs also offer limited accountability; 
their most important donors are often kept secret and policy is 
decided by officials that are often appointed rather than elected. 
Fontoura, Bharucha, and Bohm (2016) highlight the fact that civil 
society is not homogeneous and NGOs have their own distinct 
positions, as exemplified in the transnational agricultural and food 
system. While some NGOs advocate public-private partnerships, 
others resist or oppose partnerships with the state or firms. The 
arena of transnational governance is also a competitive space. 
This can allow big business to become the dominant player in a 
particular set of regulations as this leads to markets for regulation, 
where there are multiple players operating in approximately the 
same space but with variations in the rules and mechanisms 
that apply. How are citizens supposed to understand these 
differences? How can these soft law systems ensure sufficient 
levels of monitoring and regulation that are protected from the 
influence of corruption? These are undeniably important research 
questions for the future.
The interaction between global standards emerging from 
multi-stakeholder partnerships in the North and local practices 
in the South is the focus of a paper by Schounten et al. (2016). 
In analysing the Aquaculture Stewardship Council experience in 
Indonesia, they show how global standards can transform and 
guide sustainable change in supply chains. This largely depends, 
however, on their flexibility and responsiveness to bridging the 
extensive gap between global norms and the great variety of local 
cultural, technical and political practices.
The Global South and transnational 
governance
Why is transnational governance particularly important to the 
Global South? States in advanced economies have developed their 
regulatory systems over many decades. These have weakened 
somewhat under the impact of neo-liberalism and the discourse of 
deregulation, but they still maintain a role in many areas of social 
life. In structure, they are often Weberian bureaucracies that value 
expertise and neutrality in return for assured salaries and careers. 
Such systems also tend to have relatively well functioning hard 
law with a long tradition of jurisprudence and judicial neutrality. 
These systems can be corrupted, but in institutional terms, they 
tend to offer a degree of stability and path dependency that makes 
state regulation work, to a greater or lesser extent. These then 
constitute part of the state’s capacity in advanced economies.
By comparison, nations in the Global South have widely 
varying capacities on this front, largely the result of their colonial 
past, civil wars and conflicts and traditions of authoritarianism, 
militarism and corruption. Efforts to develop state capacities 
along the lines of a Weberian bureaucracy struggle against rent 
seeking and notions that the state should ‘belong’ to a particular 
class, group or nationality. Reformers in the Global South struggle 
to create state capacities that are legitimate to the constituents 
and function as neutral instruments for the benefit of society as 
a whole. Creating a state regulatory system is a difficult process.
Recently, some authors have suggested the idea that 
transnational governance systems could work as substitutes for 
weak states in terms of building institutions in particular localities. 
However, this view further undermines the scope for populations 
to create their own spaces of governance. It could also lead to 
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conflicts between Global South states and NGOs, and Global 
North transnational social movements and states seeking to 
impose their agendas on the South. Whilst problems are global 
or transnational and impact broader populations, they are often 
specifically located in particular states. As Fontoura et al. (2016) 
illustrate, civil society does not speak with one voice, and in the 
context of food and agriculture, there are substantial differences 
in the positions and alternatives proposed by NGOs from the 
South and those from the North.
Furthermore, the Global South now constitutes a driving 
force within the global economy. The MNCs from developed 
countries have eagerly expanded into the Global South in their 
search for new markets and production centres to take advantage 
of cheap labour, existing natural resources, and weak regulatory 
systems. There is, therefore an urgent need for institutions and 
processes that can improve or resist market forces in the Polanyian 
way in these countries. Whilst creating cross-governmental 
international alliances as the BRICs did at the Copenhagen 
climate talks might be helpful, more effective would probably 
be to develop strong transnational governance mechanisms that 
link local populations and state agencies into effective alliances 
with powerful NGOs. This might then help shape agendas and 
create institutions that socially embed market processes.
How the Global South benefits from transnational 
governance is an issue addressed by several papers in this Forum. 
For example, Delgado (2016) examines the Nagoya Protocol 
Access and Benefit-sharing mechanisms developed to protect 
local communities from bio-piracy. Though traditional knowledge 
is an important source for new drug development, few indigenous 
communities receive any benefits from their knowledge. More 
commonly, groups face exclusion as knowledge and bio 
resources become privatised. Delgado examines how global 
regulation travels to South Africa, India and Peru, where it only 
materializes when translated into local practices. She concludes 
that transnational governance is established through translation 
processes and assumes new forms and uses depending on the 
interests and experiences of the local actors. Each translation 
can be understood as a form of resistance to exclusion in global 
environmental governance.
Srinivas (2016) analyses mega-events, such as the 
Olympics and the FIFA World Cup, as a form of transnational 
governance through which ideas and capital flows. Mega-
events influence urban redevelopment, reconfiguring declining 
urban areas and building new infrastructure, while weakening 
the historical rights of urban residents. Additionally, Srinivas 
argues that mega-events also link local urban management 
and development to new transnational management alliances 
between market and state actors. As mega-events shift to the 
South, he argues that local elites might begin to foster social 
and political reforms, drawing on international capital and ideas, 
while lacking national popular support.
Moreover, Bruszt and McDermott (2016) conceptualize 
dramatic variations in the capacities of public sector and non-
state actors to define, implement and benefit from transnational 
regulation arising from regional and global integration strategies. The 
inclusion and empowerment of diverse domestic private and public 
sector actors in the design, monitoring and joint problem solving of 
transnational governance systems will affect the developmental and 
distributive outcomes in the Global South. The differentiated capacity 
of states, NGOs, and firms influences the distribution of economic 
benefits and the possibilities for local development.
Finally, Nogueira (2016) reviews Mark Schuller’s book 
on humanitarian aid to Haiti. Nogueira emphasises how social 
and economic factors prevent Haiti’s civil society and state from 
influencing the international aid system, largely because they 
are in too weak a position to compensate for the failures of 
international aid. Completing our Forum, Paola Perez-Aleman and 
Glenn Morgan recommend ten books that they consider classics of 
literature on this subject and also new and interesting books they 
consider as cutting edge in the field of transnational governance.
In this Forum we bring together a range of papers addressing 
this interaction between states, firms, social movements and 
transnational governance mechanisms in an effort to heighten 
awareness of the importance of this area of social research and 
its implications for public policy. We hope to encourage readers 
to examine the development of transnational governance in more 
depth and to consider its promise, limits, and challenges in terms 
of promoting a better world for all.
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